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TAXATION-INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY-The United States Supreme Court held that a non-
taxpayer has standing to bring a tax refund action under the
Internal Revenue Code and that the term "taxpayer" in the
Internal Revenue Code is not limited to the party assessed a tax.
United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995).
Lori Williams ("Williams") and her husband Jerrold Rabin
("Rabin") jointly owned their home.' Rabin incurred federal
employment tax liabilities which he failed to satisfy.2 As a
result, in June of 1987 and March of 1988, the federal
government placed a lien of nearly $15,000 on Rabin's property,
including his interest in the jointly owned home.3 After the lien
was in place, Rabin and Williams divided their marital property
prior to a divorce.' On October 25, 1988, Rabin, by quitclaim
deed, conveyed his interest in the jointly owned house to
Williams.5 Williams had no notice of the tax lien at this time
because the Government did not file the lien against the home
until November 10, 1988.'
In the following months, the Government made additional
assessments exceeding $26,000 on Rabin's property, and filed
1. United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611, 1614 (1995).
2. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1614.
3. Id. at 1614-15. The lien was authorized by the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
I.R.C. § 6321 (1988). The Government did not allege that Williams was personally
liable for any of the assessments. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
4. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
5. Id. As consideration for the house, Williams assumed three liabilities for
Rabin, none of which were tax liabilities, totaling almost $650,000. Id. A quitclaim
deed is defined as "a deed of conveyance operating by way of release; that is, in-
tended to pass any title, interest, or claim which the grantor may have in the pre-
mises, but not professing that such title is valid, nor containing any warranty or
covenants for title." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
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the assessments on June 22, 1989.' On May 9, 1989, Williams
entered into a contract to sell the house and set a closing date of
July 3, 1989.' The Government gave actual notice of over
$41,000 in tax liens to Williams and the purchaser one week
before the closing.' The purchaser threatened to sue Williams if
the sale did not take place.1" Believing that she had no
alternative, Williams authorized payment, under protest, of
$41,937 from the proceeds of the sale to the Internal Revenue
Service, so that marketable title could be conveyed at closing.1
Williams filed a claim for an administrative refund, which
was denied by the Government. 2 Williams subsequently filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California, claiming that the property was taken free of the
Government's liens." Williams pursued the tax refund action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), which acts as a waiver of
governmental sovereign immunity from suit by authorizing
federal courts to adjudicate any civil action against the United
States to recover any tax erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected. 4
The Government contended that Williams' plea could not be
heard because she lacked standing to seek a refund under
§ 1346(a)(1)."' The Government argued that this provision
authorizes actions only by those assessed a tax, not merely those
who pay a tax." The district court, relying on reasoning
established in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, accepted the
7. Id. The additional assessments were also for federal employment taxes
which Rabin failed to pay. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The Government claimed that the tax liens were valid against the
property or proceeds from its sale. Id.
10. Id.
11. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615. No alternatives were suggested by the Gov-
ernment. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See I.R.C. § 6323(a) (Supp. V 1993), which provides in pertinent part
that: "[Tihe lien imposed . . . shall not be valid . . . until notice thereof . . . has
been filed." Id.
14. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United
States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally as-
sessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected with-
out authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any man-
ner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
16. Id.
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Government's jurisdictional argument and dismissed the case.
17
Williams appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, following the Fourth Circuit opinion in Martin
v. United States," reversed the district court.1" To resolve a
conflict among the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari."
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated that the
issue before the Court was whether a non-assessed party that
paid a tax under protest in order to remove a federal lien from
property has standing to bring a tax refund action."' The Court
asserted that § 1346(a)(1) does not state that only the party
assessed a tax may sue.22 The Court held that § 1346(a)(1) uses
broad language and does not limit the term "taxpayer" to only
those parties assessed a tax. 3
The Government relied on the interaction of three provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code (the "I.R.C.") to limit the waiver of
sovereign immunity and indicated that because of the
provisions, Williams lacked standing to bring an action.24 The
first statute provides that a party may not bring a refund action
without first exhausting administrative remedies." The
17. Id. See Snodgrass v. United States, 834 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1987);
Busse v. United States, 547 F.2d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 1976). See infra notes 101-05
and accompanying text for a discussion of Snodgrass. See infra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Busse.
18. 895 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Martin.
19. Williams v. United States, 24 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1994), afld, 115 S.
Ct. 1611 (1995).
20. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
21. Id. Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia,
Souter and Breyer. Id. at 1614. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at
1620 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 1620 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 1617.
23. Id. at 1616. The Court explained that the language of § 1346(a)(1) is simi-
lar to the common law remedy of assumpsit. Id. Assumpsit affords a remedy to per-
sons who, like Williams, paid money not owed as a result of fraud, duress or mis-
take. Id.
24. Id.
25. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615. Section 7422(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides in pertinent part:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority,
or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secre-
tary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of
the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1988).
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majority found that Williams exhausted her remedies by filing
an administrative claim, which was denied.26 The second
statute cited by the Government imposes a statute of limitations
upon a taxpayer filing a claim for credit or refund.27 The
Government contended that because the section uses the term
"taxpayer," only a taxpayer may file for administrative relief
under § 7422(a) and subsequently file a refund action under 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).' 8 The Court stated that the plain terms of
the statute provide only a deadline for filing, not a limit on who
may file.2" The Court also noted that there are other provisions
of the I.R.C. which define "taxpayer" broadly, such as I.R.C.
§ 6402(a), which defines "taxpayer" as "the person who made the
overpayment," and I.R.C. §§ 6410(a) and 6419(a), both of which
describe the recipient of a refund or credit in the case of an
overpayment as "the person who paid the tax."30
By using the third provision the Government attempted to
show that Williams was not a taxpayer." Section 7701(a)(14)
defines a taxpayer as "any person subject to any internal
revenue tax."32 The Court reasoned that the term "subject to"
was broad enough to include Williams.3 Justice Ginsburg
further added that Congress did not intend actions under §
1346(a)(1) to be unavailable to individuals in Williams'
position.34
The Government offered two other options under which
Williams could have been granted relief'5 The first option was
a quiet title action under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1)." The Court
26. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1616.
27. Id. Section 6511(a) provides:
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title
in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed
by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years
from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later,
or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the
tax was paid.
I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1988).
28. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1616-17.
29. Id. at 1617. The Court explained that the statute of limitations of
§ 6511(a) narrows the waiver of sovereign immunity by penalizing those who do not
file a claim in a timely manner. Id.
30. Id. at 1617. See I.R.C. §§ 6402(a), 6410(a), 6419(a) (1988).
31. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1617.
32. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(14) (1988). The Government contended that a party who
pays a tax is not subject to the tax unless the party is the one assessed. Williams,
115 S. Ct. at 1617.
33. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1617.
34. Id. at 1618.
35. Id. at 1619.
36. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1) (1988). A quiet title action is defined as a
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concluded that a quiet title action would have offered Williams
no relief because it would have taken months to clear the title
and would not have concluded until long after the closing
date."
The second alternative form of relief posited by the
Government was I.R.C. § 6325(b)(3), which allows the
Government to discharge a lien on property if the property
owner sets aside a fund that becomes subject to a new lien.38
The Court found that this was not a plausible option for
Williams because there was no incentive for the Government to
offer such an arrangement to her." The Court stated that the
two alternatives are predeprivation relief and therefore were not
appropriate to Williams' situation, whereas § 1346(a)(1) is a
post-deprivation remedy."0
The Court acknowledged that parties generally cannot
challenge the tax liabilities of others, but noted that Williams
was not challenging the underlying assessment on her husband,
but rather the tax lien on her property.' The Court found none
of the Government's arguments persuasive, and affirmed the
judgement of the court of appeals, holding that Williams had
standing to bring a refund action.42
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, in which he joined
the opinion of the Court, except insofar as the Court held that
Williams was a "taxpayer."' Justice Scalia found this to be
unnecessary because under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), Williams had
standing to bring a refund action regardless of her status as a
.proceeding to establish the plaintiffs title to land by bringing into court an adverse
claimant and there compelling him either to establish his claim or be forever es-
topped from asserting it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (6th ed. 1990).
37. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618.
38. Id. at 1618. I.R.C. § 6325(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property
subject to the lien if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to an
agreement with the Secretary, the proceeds of such sale are to be held, as a
fund subject to the liens and claim of the United States, in the same manner
and with the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to the
discharged property.
I.R.C. § 6325(b)(3) (1988). A discharge of a lien is defined as: "To release; liberate;
annul; unburden . . . .To extinguish an obligation (e.g. a person's liability on an
instrument) ." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 463 (6th ed. 1990).
39. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1619.
40. Id. Because Williams had already paid the tax and had been deprived of
money, the Court determined that predeprivation forms of relief were inadequate. Id.
41. Id. Williams challenged her husband's assessment in the district court, but
at oral argument in the Supreme Court Williams' counsel retreated from this argu-
ment. Id. at 1619 n.10.
42. Id. at 1620.




Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, filed a dissenting opinion which concluded that
Williams did not have standing to bring a tax refund action.5
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the rules clearly state
that only a taxpayer may bring a refund action.4 ' The dissent
reasoned that § 1346(a)(1) must be read in conformity with the
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which qualify a
party's right to bring a refund suit. 7 The majority held, the
Chief Justice noted, that limiting administrative relief to only
taxpayers is inconsistent with the other provisions of the refund
scheme." Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that inconsistency, if
it exists, equals ambiguity.4 Since a waiver of sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed by the United States
in order to be sued by an individual, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that any ambiguity is construed in favor of sovereign
immunity."
The majority stated that Williams was contesting the lien on
the property, not the underlying assessment,5 ' but the dissent
reasoned that Williams was subject to a tax lien, which did not
mean that she was subject to an internal revenue tax. 2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that § 1346(a)(1) requires that a
44. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1620. Justice Scalia found that the Government's
reliance on the interaction of I.R.C §§ 7422, 6511, and 7701(a)(14) did not deny Wil-
liams standing to bring a tax refund action. Id. Particularly, Justice Scalia found
§ 6511(a) to be an administrative provision that could not significantly limit the
jurisdiction of § 1346(a)(1), which was the jurisdictional provision at issue. Id.
45. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1621. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that:
[R]eading these provisions as a whole, the conclusion is inescapable that only
a taxpayer (I.R.C. § 7701(a)(14)) who has filed a timely claim for a refund
(under I.R.C. § 6511(a)) and a timely suit for refund (under I.R.C. § 6352(a))
is authorized to maintain a suit for refund in any court (I.R.C. § 7422(a)) for
an erroneously or illegally assessed or collected tax (28 U.S.C. § 1346(aXl)).
Id.
47. Id. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). In Dalm, the Court
held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Dalm's refund suit. Dalm, 494
U.S. at 601. In order for the district court to have jurisdiction over the suit, the
Court held that Dalm was required to file a claim for a tax refund within three
years from the time the tax return was filed or within two years from the time the
tax was paid. Id. at 609. See I.R.C. §§ 6511(a), 7422(a) (1988). See supra notes 25
and 27 for the pertinent text of §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a). Since Dalm failed to meet
the statutory guidelines, the Court refused to extend jurisdiction. Dalm, 494 U.S. at
608-09.
48. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1617.
49. Id. at 1621.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1619.
52. Id. at 1622.'
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person be subject to an internal revenue tax in order to file a
claim for a refund.3 The dissent also found that other
alternative forms of relief presented by the Government were
viable options for Williams."
The judicial development of standing for a party to bring a
refund action against the United States has its roots in the
common law action of assumpsit." Assumpsit is an action to
recover money paid under fraud, duress or mistake.56 Under
the common law rule of assumpsit, a party subject to fraud,
duress or mistaken payment has standing to bring a refund
action against a tax collector. This principle was incorporated
into the Internal Revenue Code of 1878." Section 1724(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1878 was the model for § 1346(aX) of
Title 28, which created original jurisdiction for district courts in
refund actions against the United States." Section 1346(a)(1)
was enacted in 1921.' Section 1346(a)(1) grants standing to a
party to bring a refund action against the United States for an
erroneously or wrongly collected tax.61
The issue in many refund cases subsequent to the enactment
of § 1346(a)(1) has been who actually qualifies as a taxpayer
under the statute.62 In United States v. Updike," the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that the term "taxpayer" should
53. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1622.
54. Id. at 1622. Williams never sought to invoke the alternative remedies, and
the district court opined that many cases have held that a person may not claim
that an administrative remedy is inadequate if they have never sought to invoke the
remedy. Id.
55. Id. at 1616.
56. Id. Assumpsit refund actions were not available to volunteers. Id, See City
of Philadelphia v. Diehl, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 614 (1867).
57. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1616.
58. I.R.C. § 1724(a) (repealed).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. As was defined in United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990), and fol-
lowed by the dissent in Williams, other applicable statutes must be read in confor-
mity with § 1346(a)(1) to determine who qualifies as a "taxpayer." Dalm, 494 U.S.
at 601. The other applicable statutes are: I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(14) (taxpayer definition
statute), 6511(a) (claim for refund statute of limitations statute), 6352(a) (refund suit
statute of limitations statute) and 7422(a) (cause of action statute). Williams, 115 S.
Ct. at 1622.
63. 281 U.S. 489 (1930).
1996
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include individuals who were subject to a tax. " In Updike, the
Updike Grain Company dissolved and its assets were distributed
to its shareholders after satisfaction of its debt. 5 The Revenue
Act of October 3, 1917 increased the rate of taxation for that
year.66 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
issued a regulation providing that all corporations dissolved in
1917 should file amended tax returns reflecting the increased
rate. 7 The Court found that the shareholders of Updike were
taxpayers because they were subject to the tax. 6 The Court
noted that as transferees of the corporation, the shareholders
were entitled to the same rights as the corporation.69 Since the
statute of limitations had run against the corporation, it had in
turn run against the shareholders, and thus the Court dismissed
the suit.70
Although there is extensive authority that denies a non-
taxpayer the right to sue under § 1346(a), there are numerous
cases which have allowed such actions. In White v. Hopkins,71
the appellant paid taxes under protest because of a threat of
enforcement of a writ of distraint against the appellant's
property.72 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the right of recovery
of the taxes was a fundamental common law right that could not
be abridged by a statute.73 The court suggested that it cannot
be assumed that the United States would deny redress to
someone in the appellant's position.74 The court also stated that
64. Updike, 281 U.S. at 490. In Updike the Supreme Court stated:
[I]ndeed, when used to connote payment of tax, it puts no undue strain upon
the word "taxpayer" to bring within its meaning that person whose property,
being impressed with a trust to that end, is subjected to the burden. Certainly




67. Id. A revenue agent completed an amended return for the Updike Grain
Company in October of 1918, upon which additional taxes were due. Id. at 491.
68. Id. at 494. Suit to recover the amount was brought against the sharehold-
ers in 1927, more than seven years after the assessment. Id.
69. Updike, 281 U.S. at 494.
70. Id.
71. 51 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1931).
72. White, 51 F.2d at 160. Distraint is defined as:
Seizure; the act of distraining or making a distress. The inchoate right and
interest which a landlord has in the property of a tenant located on the de-
mised premises. Upon tenant's default, a landlord may in some jurisdictions
distrain upon the tenant's property, generally by changing the locks and giving
notice, and the landlord will then have a lien upon the goods.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (6th ed. 1990).
73. White, 51 F.2d at 161.
74. Id. at 163.
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the term "taxpayer" as used in the I.R.C. cannot exclude the
general and commonly understood meaning of that term.75 The
appellant in White was treated as the taxpayer, was subject to
the tax in question and therefore, the court held, came within
the meaning and intent of the definition of the term
"taxpayer."
76
In Parsons v. Anglim, 7 Parsons, a widow, paid her taxes as a
joint tenant with right of survivorship." The Government took
the position that Parsons was the taxpayer. 9 After paying the
taxes, Parsons filed a claim for a tax refund of the taxes paid in
a district court, which was denied." Parsons appealed and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
The court noted that the distinction in Parsons was that at the
time the taxes were paid, both Parsons and the Government
considered her to be the taxpayer. 2 Parsons paid the taxes
voluntarily and was thereafter denied relief 3 The court held
that suits for wrongfully collected taxes may be maintained
without duress and the demand of the Commissioner.'
There is significant authority that holds that a non-taxpayer
does not have the right to bring a refund action under
§ 1346(a)(1) of 28 U.S.C. In Stuart v. Chinese Chamber of
Commerce,5 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (the
"Chamber") brought suit against the Internal Revenue Service to
recover money allegedly belonging to it which had been seized
by the Collector of Internal Revenue.6 The Ninth Circuit Court
75. Id.
76. Id. The court concluded that "[any other conclusion would work injustice
and deprive appellant of his common-law right of recovery." Id.
77. 143 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1944).
78. Parsons, 143 F.2d at 535. The right of survivorship is defined as "ftlhe
right of a survivor of a deceased person to the property of said deceased. A distin-
guishing characteristic of a joint tenancy relationship, upon the death of any joint
tenant, the deceased tenants interests pass, not to the tenants lawfully designated
beneficiaries, but to surviving joint tenants." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1326 (6th ed.
1990).
79. Parsons, 143 F.2d at 536.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 537.
82. Id. at 536.
83. Id.
84. Parsons, 143 F.2d at 536.
85. 168 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1948).
86. Stuart, 168 F.2d at 710. Ung Too Thet ("Thet") was arrested in October of
1945 by agents of the Narcotics Bureau. Id. During a search of Thet's premises the
agents found a safe containing $32,000. Id. The Collector of Internal Revenue ap-
plied the money seized by the agents against Thet's unpaid income taxes which
totaled $25,893. Id. The Chamber claimed that Thet had no interest in the money
other than safe-keeping thereof. Id.
1996
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of Appeals held that the Chamber could not seek a refund as
could a taxpayer, but rather, needed to bring suit to recover
possession of property which it claimed it owned. 7
In First National Bank of Emlenton v. United States,"5 the
First National Bank of Emlenton (the "Bank") brought suit to
have a money judgment enforced against the Government. "
The Bank's action was rejected because the court found that
§ 1346(a)(1) only authorized "taxpayers" to sue to recover back
taxes which were wrongfully paid.9
In Phillips v. United States"' the court examined the
statutory construction of § 1346(a)(1) as it related to the waiver
of sovereign immunity, and although the court stated that the
language of § 1346(a)(1) could be interpreted broadly, the court
found that judicial interpretation of a waiver of sovereign
immunity does not include generosity or broad interpretation. 2
The Phillips court concluded that the waiver of sovereign
immunity from § 1346(a)(1) should not be extended to suits by
non-taxpayers. 3 This narrow interpretation of the waiver of
sovereign immunity from Phillips has been followed in
numerous cases to deny tax refund actions by non-taxpayers.94
87. Id. at 712.
88. 265 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1959).
89. First Natl Bank, 265 F.2d at 298. The Bank argued that the District
Director of the Internal Revenue Service seized and sold equipment of the Barrett
Machine Tool Corporation for back taxes, upon which the Bank held a valid chattel
mortgage. Id. at 299. Therefore, the Bank argued, the District Director, knowing of
the Bank's mortgage, should have given the Bank the net proceeds of the sale of the
equipment, after the tax liens were satisfied. Id. The Director did not and the Bank
claimed that the United States owed it $7,000. Id.
90. Id. at 299-300.
91. 346 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965). The Second Circuit, in following Stuart and
First Nat'l Bank, found that § 1346(a)(1) is not available to a plaintiff who did not
bring suit as a taxpayer. Phillips, 346 F.2d at 1000. In Phillips the Internal Reve-
nue Service collected, pursuant to a notice of levy, $680.94 from the New Rochelle
Thermatool Corporation. Id. at 999. The levy was made on the assumption that
Thermatool owed this sum to Ray Johnson. Id. Phillips alleged that the money was
owed to him and not Johnson, and that he was entitled to its return. Id.
92. Id. See also Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941). Hammond was an appeal from a judgment
of the district court holding that Isabelle Hammond-Knowlton, as administratrix of
the estate of Charles C. Knowlton, was entitled to recover the overpayment of feder-
al estate taxes. Hammond, 121 F.2d at 192. The appellate court reversed the district
court's judgment. Id. at 206.
93. Phillips, 346 F.2d at 1000.
94. See Mill Factors Corp. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
On June 2, 1970 Mill Factors Corporation ("Mill Factors") foreclosed on a lien and
took possession of Vamco Incorporated's ("Vamco") property. Mill Factors, 391 F.
Supp. at 388. The Internal Revenue Service had made assessments on Vamco for
failure to withhold and deposit income, unemployment and social security taxes. Id.
Mill Factors was notified by the I.R.S. that it was responsible for Vamco's unpaid
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In Busse v. United States,95 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals denied a refund action by a spouse who had paid taxes
owed by her husband to clear title to her property. 6 The
Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning in Phillips and construed
the § 1346(a)(1) waiver of sovereign immunity narrowly.97 The
Seventh Circuit also attempted to further define the meaning of
the term "taxpayer" as it related to refund actions under
§ 1346(a)(1).9 Citing the Court of Claims, the court of appeals
stated that a "taxpayer" under § 1346(a)(1) is strictly limited to
"the taxpayer who has overpaid his own taxes."99 Other courts
have given § 1346(a)(1) a similar interpretation, holding that the
section should be read merely as authorizing a taxpayer to sue
for a refund of back taxes which they have wrongfully been
required to pay."
taxes. Id. Mill Factors filed a claim for wrongful levy on October 5, 1971, which was
rejected. Id. The court found that under § 1346(a)(1) even when a party owns or has
an interest in property, which is levied upon to satisfy the tax assessments of an-
other, the party is not the taxpayer. Id. at 389. See also Economy Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Economy Heating ("Econo-
my") entered a joint venture with Lieb Brothers to construct facilities at Scott Air
Force Base in Belleville, Illinois. Economy Plumbing, 470 F.2d at 586. The joint
venture was awarded a contract of $545,000 by the Corps of Engineers to perform
the work. Id. at 587. The Internal Revenue Service asserted tax liens against Lieb
Brothers of $478,000. Id. Without notice to Economy, the General Accounting Office
transferred that sum to the Internal Revenue Service to satisfy the tax liens against
Lieb Brothers. id. Economy filed a tax refind claim which was rejected. Id. See also
Eighth St. Baptist Church Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1970). The
Eighth Street Baptist Church (the "Church") sued to recover federal income taxes
withheld by it from its employees. Baptist Church, 431 F.2d at 1194. The court
found the Church was not the taxpayer, but instead was merely the collection agent
for its taxpayer-employees. Id. Thus the Church did not have standing to sue. Id.
95. 542 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1976).
96. Busse, 542 F.2d at 425.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 424 (citing Collins v. United States, 532 F.2d 1344, 1347 n.2 (Ct.
Cl. 1976)).
100. See Hofheinz v. United States, 511 F.2d 661, 662 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
First Nat'l Bank of Emlenton v. United States, 265 F.2d 297, 299-300 (3d Cir.
1959)). In Hofheinz, Roy Hofheinz was appointed the executor of Irene Hofheinz's
(the "decedent") estate. Hotheinz, 511 F.2d at 662. The decedent's will gave two mil-
lion dollars in real estate and securities to a family trust (the "Trust"). Id. On Au-
gust 31, 1967, a portion of the decedent's stock in Houston Sports Authority was
transferred to the Trust in accordance with the will. Id. The executor placed a
$96.59 value per share on the stock. Id. The Internal Revenue Service audited the
decedent's federal estate tax return and determined that the fair market value of
the stock was $400 per share. Id. This discrepancy resulted in an I.R.S. assessment
of a two million dollar deficiency which the executor paid out of the assets of the
Trust. Id. The Trust brought suit for a refund. Id. The executor argued that the
Trust, which was not the taxpayer, lacked standing to sue. Id. The court found in
favor of the executor. Id.
In Busse, the Seventh Circuit also discussed the fact that other courts had
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In Snodgrass v. United States,1"' the Fifth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether a refund of federal taxes, penalties and
interest paid by a husband with funds that belonged to his wife
and their community property should have been granted."'
Mrs. Snodgrass brought her refund action under § 1346(a)(1),
seeking to recover her undivided one-half interest in the home,
which was approximately $25,000.1" The court found that
§ 1346(a)(1) is capable of broad interpretation, but chose to
follow other courts when it decided the issue." The Fifth
Circuit, therefore found that the statute permits only a taxpayer
who has paid a tax to seek a refund, thus adopting the "policy of
narrow construction of waivers of immunity."15
In 1990, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Dalm,"6
concluded that § 1346(a)(1) could not be interpreted alone to
establish if a party has standing to sue the Internal Revenue
Service."°7 The Court reasoned that § 1346(a)(1) must be read
allowed tax refund actions by non-taxpayers. These holdings contradicted Busse, but
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that United States v. Halton Tractor, 258 F.2d 612,
617 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that a party who pays a tax under compulsion rather
than protest cannot be considered a volunteer and has standing to bring a refund
action) and McMahon v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 490 (D.R.I. 1959) (holding that
a non-taxpayer could bring a refund action) were attempts by courts to correct the
failure of the Internal Revenue Code prior to 1966 to provide a remedy for a party
whose property was harmed by a wrongful governmental levy. Busse, 542 F.2d at
424. The Seventh Circuit viewed these cases permitting actions by non-taxpayers
against the Government as an effort by the courts to solve an inequitable situation.
Id. This situation, the Seventh Circuit noted, was remedied by legislation in 1966,
and therefore courts following Busse would no longer find it necessary to allow re-
fund suits by non-taxpayers. Id. at 425.
101. 834 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1987). The Snodgrass court followed the decisions
in Phillips v. United States, 346 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) and Busse v. United
States, 542 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1976).
102. Snodgrass, 834 F.2d at 538. Mr. Snodgrass had not paid federal income
and social security taxes for the Latham Exploration Company, of which he was an
official. Id. The Internal Revenue Service filed notices of liens on Snodgrass' proper-
ty, including a home which was community property of Mr. and Mrs. Snodgrass. Id.
The Snodgrass' sold their home and in order to clear the liens from the title, gave
the net proceeds of the sale, approximately $51,000 to the Internal Revenue Service.
Id.
103. Id. at 539.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
107. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 601. In Dalm, the taxpayer, Francis Dalm ('Dalm"),
was given payments in 1976 and 1977 as gifts. Id. at 599. Dalm paid the gift tax in
1976, but failed to pay gift tax on the 1977 payment. Id. Dalm was sued by the In-
ternal Revenue Service for the deficiency. Id. The case was settled and Dalm agreed
to pay the deficiency stipulated by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. In October of
1984, immediately after the settlement, Dalm filed a claim for a refund of the gift
tax paid on the payment in 1976. Id. at 599-600. Dalm claimed the district court
had jurisdiction under § 1346(a)(1), and the Government argued that under
Recent Decisions
in conformity with other statutory provisions which qualify a
taxpayer's standing to bring a refund suit."8 Although Dalm
mainly concerned a claim for a tax refund that failed to meet the
statute of limitations, the implications went beyond that.
Following Dalm, in order to determine whether a party has
standing to bring a refund action, all appropriate statutes must
be considered rather than relying on § 1346(a)(1) alone.11
In Martin v. United States,"' the Fourth Circuit digressed
from the broad view taken by other courts that allow non-
taxpayer refund actions."' According to the court in Martin,
the answer to the question of who has standing to bring a
refund action lies in the plain meaning of the statute."' The
Fourth Circuit pointed out that although the statute does not
enumerate who can sue, its language may be interpreted to say
that a person erroneously assessed -a tax or a person from whom
a tax was erroneously collected has standing to sue."" The
Fourth Circuit held that § 1346(a)(1) allows a party who
erroneously or wrongfully paid taxes to sue for a refund of those
taxes."n
To analyze the Supreme Court's holding in Williams, it is
necessary to understand the relief requested and the limited
scope of the Court's holding. Williams claimed that the tax she
paid was erroneously collected."6 Williams paid the tax under
protest and then brought an action for a refund."7 The Court
§ 6511(a), Dalm had to fie a claim for refund of the gift tax paid by December
1979. Id. Since Dalm failed to meet the statutory deadline of § 6511(a), which the
Court said must be coupled with § 1346(a)(1), the Court held that the district court
lacked jurisdiction. Id
108. Id. at 601. According to the Court, the statutes that must also be consid-
ered in conjunction with § 1346(a)(1) are 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511(a) and 7422(a). Id. at
601-02. See supra notes 27 and 25 respectively for the pertinent text of §§ 6511(a)
and 7422(a).
110. See Dalm, 494 U.S. at 601.
111. 895 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1990).
112. Martin, 895 F.2d at 994. Mona Martin ("Martin") divorced her husband,
Jerry Brodsky ("Brodsky"), in 1979. Id. at 992. As part of the divorce settlement,
Brodsky deeded his interest in their home to Martin. Id. Prior to the divorce, the
Internal Revenue Service filed notice of a federal tax lien against the home of
$20,225 for taxes owed by Brodsky related to his business. Id. Martin sold the house
to the Jennings on October 30, 1984. Id. At closing, Martin's attorney, Seganish,
withheld from the sale proceeds $21,600. Id. Without notice to Martin, and after
unsuccessful attempts to have the lien cleared, Seganish paid $18,822 to the Internal
Revenue Service in order to deliver clear title to the Jennings. Id. at 993. When
Martin heard of the payment, she brought a refund action for the amount paid. Id.
113. Id. at 994.
114. Id.
115. Id.




held that Williams had standing to bring a refund action and
thus affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals."'
The Supreme Court did not decide the circumstances under
which a party who volunteers to pay a tax assessed against
another may seek a refund under § 1346(a)(1)."' The
Government feared that volunteering to pay another's tax, as a
result of the Court's holding, would become abusive.2 The
Court rejected this scenario, finding little incentive for a
volunteer to pay another's taxes, as a way to evade them.'2 '
Also, the Government did not provide evidence that such
schemes were commonplace in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,
both of which permit individuals in Williams' position to bring
refund suits."2  Thus, the Court's holding is limited to
individuals who, though not assessed a tax, pay the tax because
no other alternative forms of relief are at their disposal.
In allowing Williams' refund action, the Court reasoned that
she was a taxpayer. 23 Williams paid the tax and was therefore
subject to it."' As the Court stated previously in Updike, it
would be hard to convince a person, such as Williams, that they
had not paid a tax." Many of the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code identify the taxpayer as the one who paid the tax
or who was subject to it."6 By finding that Williams was
subject to a tax, the Court reasoned that she fell squarely within
the definition and meaning of the term "taxpayer" as used in the
Internal Revenue Code."7 The Court looked to the plain
meaning of § 1346(a)(1) and found implicit in the statute's
language that one from whom a tax has been erroneously
assessed or collected has standing to sue."8 There can be little
doubt that Williams was erroneously required to pay a tax, was
subject to that tax and therefore had standing to bring her
refund action.
The holding in Williams has already been extended to an
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1620.
120. Id.
121. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1620.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1617. Section 7701(a)(14) of the Internal Revenue Code defines a
taxpayer as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(14)
(1988).
125. Updike, 281 U.S. at 494.





action against the Internal Revenue Service for a wrongful
levy.' The application of the holding in Williams to a
wrongful levy action does not mean that widespread application
to a variety of actions will be common. Instead, the rule
developed in Williams develops a common sense approach to tax
law. Williams' only meaningful option for redress was a tax
refund action. Common sense indicates that she should be
allowed to pursue that action.
The significant language to be interpreted from the holding in
Williams is the meaning of "subject to" in the Internal Revenue
Code. The Court found that if an individual has paid a tax, they
are "subject to" that tax and are thus a "taxpayer" under the
Internal Revenue Code.1' This view is a departure from
previous decisions in this area, where in the past only a party
assessed could bring a refund action. As a result, the Internal
Revenue Service will need to change its regulations when
dealing with tax refund actions by non-assessed taxpayers.
Now and in the future, a spouse who pays the taxes of the
other spouse, a corporation that pays the taxes of its debtor to
avoid further loss or a beneficiary of a will where the decedent
had tax liabilities, will all have standing to sue the federal
government for tax refunds under § 1346(a)(1). It should be
pointed out that none of these tax payments can be made
voluntarily as a donation for the party who owed the tax. The
party seeking standing under § 1346(a)(1) must be compelled to
bring a refund action. While the holding of Williams represents
a change for future tax litigation, other remedies which were
inadequate in Williams may still be appropriate in other
situations.
In Williams, the Supreme Court was faced with a situation
where a party, through no fault of her own, was required to pay
a tax the party did not owe and for which there was no remedy.
129. See WWSM Investors v. United States, 64 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 1995). In
WWSM, the Internal Revenue Service levied on the bank account of Advanced Plas-
tic Engineering Corporation, a WWSM investor, seizing the funds to satisfy the tax
liabilities of the corporation. WWSM, 64 F.3d at 457. WWSM had lent money to
Advanced Plastics for payroll taxes owed and when Advanced Plastics defaulted,
WWSM foreclosed on a security agreement and seized Advanced Plastic's assets. Id
The Internal Revenue Service denied WWSM's request for a return of the levied
funds, and thus WWSM filed suit. Id. The district court found that WWSM's only
remedy was for a wrongful levy under I.R.C. § 7426, under which the statute of lim-
itations had run. Id. at 458. The Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Williams. Id. The court of appeals explained that, under Wil-
liams, a third party such as WWSM had standing to sue the Government under
§ 134 6(aX1) to recover the taxes paid for another. Id. at 459.
130. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618.
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The Government's fear that allowing Williams to recover would
open the flood gates to this type of litigation is unfounded. There
is no incentive for a volunteer to pay another's taxes. In the end,
although Williams was not the assessed party, she was the
taxpayer. Williams paid a tax that she did not owe, and the
Court correctly allowed her to obtain a refund in accordance
with the applicable statutes. Congress could not have intended
for one who wrongly paid a tax or had a tax erroneously
collected from them to be left with no redress.
Paul H. Minton
